Relationship Between Philosophy and Physics

 a Possible Complementarity

When I speak of causal explanation, I mean providing the physical reason for a phenomenon. From the moment things are formulated mathematically, we are no longer dealing with the ultimate physical reason. Indeed, a physical law remains an abstraction that tends to correspond—without ever fully achieving it—to the natural order.

A physical theory involves several levels of abstraction:
• A worldview – even if implicit, it is more or less present in the foundational concepts of the theory;
• The mathematical aspect;
• The operational formulation.

A worldview is more or less true. A physical theory is more or less verified. A worldview, by its universality, can never be completely verified.

Theoretical physics can be defined as the pursuit of coherence in the structure and movement of the physical world, through knowledge of quantitative proportions and within a certain mathematical formalism: to model this behavior into laws in order to predict it. The primary concepts of a theory must reflect this coherence in the structure and movement of the physical world. In this way, a certain worldview is present in physics.

If philosophy discovers principles that have not only ontological and intelligible value, but also efficience, then a practical encounter between philosophy and physics may be possible (a transition from the analysis of being to that of phenomena).

There are various possible points of contact between philosophy and science:
• The question of the foundations of knowledge (what this science grasps of reality, from the standpoint of what that reality is);
• The critical aspect (e.g., “the shuttle and missile objection” which challenges the concept of time derived from special relativity);
• A practical encounter (when two forms of knowledge, in studying a particular object and reaching what is most fundamental in reality, discover themselves to be complementary).

What remains to be clarified is how, and under what conditions, this practical encounter between philosophy and physics can take place—a vast topic. But to formulate a general theory of the universe, such an encounter is unavoidable, since the notion of causality must be preserved. This, as previously explained, is not the case with relativity.

Some consider this objective utopian, because they do not regard philosophy as a science. I do not share this view. For a practical encounter between philosophy and physics to take place, we must, from an epistemological standpoint, adopt a sufficiently general definition of the concept of science—one that encompasses both.

To that end, here is the definition I propose:

“(...) In every scientific endeavor, there are shared criteria. Thus, every scientific approach is an analysis that seeks to discover what is necessary in a given domain—this necessity being attained through principles that each science either discovers or establishes for itself based on its object of inquiry. From a critical or experimental perspective, each science investigates how thought relates to its object, and from there, thematizes this relationship. ‘Necessity’ is, first, the universal—discovered through, but beyond, the particular and contingent; and second, by way of return, it is a new understanding of the particular in light of the universal. Moreover, each science is aware of its own methodology, and continuously adjusts between the universality of the principles it employs and the contingent mode of reality it studies; each science, critically or experimentally, will discover how this adjustment must be made.

This paragraph gives a very broad definition of the concept of science. It can be applied equally to philosophy and physics. It offers a specific universality that allows for a practical encounter between the two domains.”
Excerpt from the book À la recherche de la théorie de l’univers (1990), Philippe de Bellescize, self-published. For the record, I had sent it at the time to Hubert Reeves, who kindly replied.

The principle used by realistic philosophy in its scientific endeavor (in the sense just given) is causality, which can be formulated as follows: in a reality exhibiting structure and order, there must be something within it that accounts for it—what we call causality. Every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause, because a cause is a principle that truly exists.

“To what extent can philosophy be considered a science? It is causal analysis (...) that enables philosophy to be a science. Yet all causal analysis, ultimately, rests on metaphysics. Cause implies something that endures—something that endures from the standpoint of being. Since science is the discovery of necessity, it is still necessary to discover the foundation of that necessity within existing reality (…). If it is an a priori idea that allows me to discover a kind of necessity in the analysis of this reality, then philosophical analysis remains subjective, for what grounds necessity will not have been discovered in that very reality.”
Excerpt from À la recherche de la théorie de l’univers (1990), Philippe de Bellescize.

The principle used by physics in its scientific method is the physical law, which—as previously explained—remains an abstraction that tends to correspond, without ever fully achieving it, to the natural order. That is why, in a physical theory, the levels of abstraction described above remain relatively independent.

My philosophical analysis of the physical world tends to demonstrate that the motive principle of the physical world acts immanently and through interrelation, according to the determination of elements (1). This has, to my knowledge, been only minimally explained by philosophy. Without a motive principle acting in this way, bodies would be merely juxtaposed, and the unity of the universe would collapse. This mode of action of the motive principle of the universe leads almost inevitably to a completely relational conception of space-time.

This conception is not fully compatible with certain conclusions of relativity. The nature of the motive principle of the physical world does not fall within the domain of physics. However, in a general vision of the physical world, one can and should take into account this mode of action, adopting a fully relational approach to space-time.

In this way, we achieve a practical convergence between philosophy and physics, where each field contributes its own precision.

Note 1: This corresponds quite well to the bootstrap theory proposed by Chew:
« Voici une définition (…) du bootstrap donnée par Chew : Le seul mécanisme qui satisfait aux principes généraux de la physique est le mécanisme de la nature (…); (…) Les particules observées (…) représentent le seul système quantique et relativiste qui peut être conçu sans contradiction interne (…). Chaque particule nucléaire joue trois rôles différents : 1) un rôle de constituant des ensembles composés ; 2) un rôle de médiateur de la force responsable de la cohésion de l’ensemble composé ; et 3) un rôle de système composé. Dans cette définition, la partie apparaît en même temps que le tout. La nature est conçue comme étant une entité globale, non séparable au niveau fondamental. » (Basarab Nicolescu, Nous, la particule et le monde, Le Mail, 1985, pages 41-42).

“Here is a definition (...) of the bootstrap approach given by Chew: The only mechanism that satisfies the general principles of physics is nature’s own mechanism (...); the observed particles (...) represent the only quantum-relativistic system that can be conceived without internal contradiction (...). Each nuclear particle plays three different roles: 1) as a constituent of composite systems; 2) as a force mediator responsible for the cohesion of the composite system; and 3) as a composite system itself. In this definition, the part appears at the same time as the whole. Nature is conceived as a global entity, non-separable at the fundamental level.’”
(Basarab Nicolescu, Nous, la particule et le monde, Le Mail, 1985, pp. 41–42)

It remains to apply this to space and motion.

Philippe de Bellescize