The notion of a system of thought in my works

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND THEORY

WARNING

In this short essay we have intentionally limited our subject. It has been developed in the form of theses, without attempting to make explicit all the critical foundations. The subject also involves several philosophical approaches that we have chosen not to develop. We did not want an abundance of details to end up obscuring the main topic. Two theses can be identified in this work on which a constructive critique may be developed.

THESIS 1 : There is a possible practical encounter between philosophy and science. This practical encounter implies the creation of an intermediate domain that we have called a system of thought. Philosophy, considered as a science, can establish a link between our “ordinary” knowledge of the world and the knowledge of the so-called exact sciences. One may think that the various sciences, once they have reached maturity, rediscover a certain unity by reaching, each in its own way, what is fundamental in reality. Different forms of knowledge, fully aware of their own perspectives, could thus discover themselves to be complementary.

THESIS 2 : It seems that science, once it has reached maturity, will not be able to avoid the formalization of the initial concepts of physics within a system of thought. Indeed, only the formalization within such a system can claim to express, in a global and adequate manner, the logical and meaningful unity of the image of the world.

“Thinkers once believed that the notion of being had to be repudiated; and now that they perceive the inconsistency of their approach, they observe with dismay that in the meantime this notion has become strangely difficult to recover if one wishes to respect the facts.”(1)

The principles at the basis of the system of thought attempt to link the philosophical question of the nature of the physical world with that of its behavior.

It is not necessary, in order to follow this work, to adhere to Thesis 1.

Thesis 2 seems important to us with regard to an epistemological critique of the initial concepts of physics. The notion of a conceptual postulate therefore becomes necessary, and if certain conclusions do not prove satisfactory it remains necessary to discover other postulates, while verifying the deductive aspect of the reasoning.

Preface

In this small book we have attempted to elaborate a vision of the world that respects both the current advances of science and the notions of being and meaning that belong to philosophy.

The birth of modern science, if we look for example at the contribution of Galileo, occurred through a liberation from theological and philosophical constraints. In order to establish its own particular status, science discovered its own method of approaching the universe. The emancipation of science consisted in replacing arguments from authority, whether religious or philosophical, with the testing of different theories through mathematical formulation and experimentation. Galileo was moreover condemned by the Church, which adhered to the geocentric vision of Aristotle, close to the theological interpretations of the time, rather than to a heliocentric vision. One may note that Aristotle was particularly valued in the Church by Saint Albert the Great and Saint Thomas Aquinas, who would nevertheless certainly have respected the contribution of modern science. The whole work of Saint Thomas Aquinas indeed aims at respecting the requirements of intelligence in relation to those of faith (these questions remain, as one may understand, entirely relevant today). The erroneous conclusions of Aristotle, as well as those of Galileo, concerning their representation of the world should not make us forget that each of them contributed, in his own way, to the establishment of rational and scientific methods proper to philosophy and science.

Should we now maintain two systems of representation of the world? One, more elementary, based on immediate experience and philosophy; another, more elaborate, corresponding to scientific practice, according to a situation that is in fact quite old and linked to the birth of modern science? It seems to us that a vision of the world should be able to unite the notions of being and meaning, closer to philosophy, with the analysis of phenomena corresponding to scientific practice. The distortion between these two approaches contributes to perpetuating in the scientific method the separation between the search for a conceptual aspect and the search for a synthesis of mathematical and operational advances. The refusal of any vision of the world amounts, at least partially, to denying the role of the concept in intellectual knowledge.

In the evolution of ideas in physics, Einstein and Infeld decided “to sketch in broad outline the attempts of the human mind to find the connection between the world of ideas and the world of phenomena” (2). Faced with the complexity of the universe and the diversity of possible mathematical formulations, science constructs various representations of the world that guide its research.

“Scientific experience is first of all a thought experiment — and sometimes even nothing but that! The scientist must always imagine” an idealized experiment which, in fact, can never be realized, since it is impossible to eliminate all influences. “But although it can never actually be realized, an ‘idealized experiment leads to a deep understanding of real experiments ”(3)

Thought experiments make it possible to carry out idealized experiments, but also to test concepts. A concept is indeed interesting only if one is capable of relating it to others and studying its domain of validity. Our aim in this short essay is therefore, on the one hand, to approach a more unified vision of the world — in the sense that different intellectual approaches having a common object cannot be completely disparate — and, on the other hand, to test certain concepts once the initial conditions have been established. For example, if one admits that energy is due to an immanent (non-local) action of a principle within constituents, then a definition of space becomes necessary, and subsequently a definition of motion. We establish here the basis of what we will later call a system of thought. From the moment one posits a conceptual hypothesis, one can study its consequences, that is to say discover other concepts that can be linked to it by deduction in order subsequently to study their domain of validity.

The primary concepts of a theory carry a certain vision of the world. These concepts have specific characteristics (what do they refer to?) but also structural characteristics (their relation to semantic, mathematical and physical axioms). These specific characteristics concern stability, transformation and the motion of bodies in space according to a certain conception of what energy may be. These characteristics, from our point of view, can be approached adequately within a system of thought for various reasons. Fundamental concepts must be identified, organized hierarchically, and possess a coherence reflecting the homogeneity of the physical phenomenon. A theory that aims to be global must be conceptually adequate to the physical world. Ultimately, one must therefore consider these characteristics for themselves, beyond their connection with the other aspects of the theory.

Note 1: Bernard d'Espagnat, Preface, "An Uncertain Reality"

Note 2: Einstein and Infeld "The Evolution of Physics"

Note 3: François Jourde, article "Theory and Experiment", quoting Einstein and Infeld "The Evolution of Physics", pages 11 and 13.