Waves, Metaphysics, and levels
of Abstractions in Physics
(Links at the end of the page to the debate between Curt Jaimungal and Bas van Fraassen)
The conceptual difficulties of framework theories like relativity or quantum mechanics may stem, in part, from an entanglement of levels with different statuses : the mathematical formalism, the interpretative framework, and physical reality itself. When one speaks, for example, of the wave function, one is referring above all to a mathematical object. This object does say something about the physical world—since it enables remarkably accurate predictions—but it cannot, by itself, tell us what a wave really is. The formalism encodes information about reality without directly providing its ontology.
The same applies to proposals such as the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie or Bohm: they constitute coherent interpretative attempts, and some of their intuitions may converge with a relational approach to reality, but they remain tied to a specific mathematical formalism and should not be confused with a primary ontological framework. To say, as I do in my perspective, that one adopts as initial principles a driving principle—acting immanently and through interrelation according to the determination of the elements—and constituent entities therefore does not amount to proposing an additional equation or a competing physical theory; it is to posit an interpretative framework, that is, a way of thinking about what the formalized results can mean. Such a framework does not exhaust what actually takes place and in no way closes off research; on the contrary, it makes possible several mathematical formulations, each of which constitutes a way of questioning reality.
Difficulties arise when the interpretative framework is conflated with the mathematical formalism itself. In such cases, one may be led to draw erroneous conclusions about the nature of reality, by attributing to the physical world properties that in fact belong only to the descriptive tools. It remains necessary, of course, to examine—on a case-by-case basis—whether a given experimental result, associated with a particular formalism, is compatible with a specific interpretative framework. This task is complex and demanding, and it allows neither shortcuts nor abusive simplifications. This is why one must be wary of any temptation—intentional or not—to take the formalism for reality itself.
In my books, I show that the interpretative framework I propose makes it possible to address certain conceptual difficulties in relativity. It remains to be seen whether it can also shed light on some of the fundamental questions raised by quantum theory. In this respect, the debate between Curt Jaimungal and Bas van Fraassen is particularly illuminating, as it focuses precisely on these fundamental distinctions: between formal coherence, interpretation, explanation, and ontological commitment. These distinctions do not resolve the problems of quantum mechanics, but they are a necessary condition for formulating them correctly.
Note on the pilot-wave approach
I would like to clarify from the outset that I am in agreement with the pilot-wave approach. My point here is essentially epistemological: as soon as an ontology is formulated mathematically and allows for testable predictions, one is no longer dealing with pure metaphysics, but already with a physico-theoretical framework.
Historically, the pilot-wave approach was introduced by Louis de Broglie and later fully formalized by David Bohm, who showed that this approach reproduces all the predictions of standard quantum mechanics. Subsequent work by John Bell further established that any realistic theory compatible with quantum results must be nonlocal, which gives the pilot-wave approach genuine conceptual coherence.
One may also note that the pilot-wave theory is, in principle, compatible with the results of the Young double-slit experiment: it reproduces the observed interference patterns while maintaining a particle that is always localized and guided by a real wave, with interference carried by the wave rather than by the particle itself.
Finally, it is worth recalling that Louis de Broglie, Nobel Prize laureate in physics, considered the possibility that the photon might possess an extremely small mass. Although this hypothesis is not retained within the current standard framework, it is consistent with my own analyses of inertia and with the idea that dynamical properties do not reduce to a purely formal description, but instead refer to an effective physical reality.
Video resources :
Physics Doesn’t Contain Causation
I subscribe to the epistemological position defended by Bas van Fraassen in this video. This position does not, however, exclude—under certain conditions—the possibility of a practical encounter between philosophy and physics, that is, the joint elucidation of the most fundamental possible interpretative framework, which is precisely the thesis I develop in my books.
Causality cannot be reduced either to a relation between antecedent and consequent, or to a mere principle of intelligibility. It is that which accounts for the existence of things, their structure, and their behavior. For there to be a real relation between antecedent and consequent, a reality must in fact behave in one way or another.
Bas van Fraassen – Why Science Doesn’t Reveal Reality
Philosophy's Moost Formidable Living Mind
The Vertical Causality That Shapes Everything We Can't Measure